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Formula Apportionment: 
Factor Allocation and Tax Avoidance 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of how firms react to tax incentives in a formula 
apportionment (FA) tax regime. Under FA, the profits of all consolidated entities of a 
business group are summed and then allocated according to a formula based on FA 
factors. We hypothesize that firms may change the allocation of real production factors 
and/or manipulate the FA factor through tax avoidance strategies. Analysing FA tax 
effects of the German local business tax with payroll expense as the exclusive FA 
factor, we find empirical evidence consistent with both hypotheses. Regarding the 
allocation of production factors, we observe significant tax effects on labour input at the 
intensive margin but not on labour input at the extensive margin. In addition, we find 
evidence of an indirect FA spillover effect on capital investment. Our findings on tax 
avoidance proxies are consistent with tax-induced manipulations of payroll expense as 
an FA factor to save tax payments. 
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1 Introduction 
Using firm data at the establishment level, this paper empirically analyses the impact of 
a payroll formula apportionment (FA) regime on business activity. Under FA, the 
profits of all consolidated entities of a business group are summed and then allocated 
according to a formula based on measurable proxies for inputs and/or outputs (e.g., 
payroll expense, sales, fixed assets). Due to the difficulties in calculating arm’s length 
prices for intra-group transactions and the resulting opportunities for firm tax base 
erosion and profit shifting (Dharmapala, 2014), FA has been suggested as an alternative 
for the separate accounting (SA) regime in international taxation (Altshuler & Grubert, 
2010; Clausing, 2013; Gresik, 2010; Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller, & Schjelderup, 2010). 
Examples include unitary taxation in the U.S. and Canada and the concept of the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) of the European Union. 
While there is considerable empirical research on the incentive effects of SA tax 
regimes (see Feld & Heckemeyer, 2011, for tax effects on foreign direct investment and 
Dharmapala, 2014, for research on tax avoidance using profit shifting strategies), few 
studies address the impact of FA on business activity (e.g., Gupta & Mills, 2002). Most 
of these studies analyse the U.S. unitary taxation regime using state-level data 
(Clausing, 2016; Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; Gupta & Hofmann, 2003; Klassen & 
Shackelford, 1998; Lightner, 1999; Weiner, 1996). Hence, our knowledge of FA effects 
at the firm and establishment level is limited. As a result, attempts to assess the 
budgetary and firm-specific consequences of introducing FA instead of SA typically do 
not account for behavioural responses (Clausing & Lahav, 2011; Devereux & Loretz, 
2008; Hines, 2010; Shackelford & Slemrod, 1998).1 
From a theoretical perspective, an FA-based income tax can be interpreted as a tax upon 
the FA factors of the apportionment formula (McLure, 1981). It follows that FA factor 
allocations are distorted by tax rate differences (Gordon & Wilson, 1986). In line with 
this argumentation, recent research on the German local business tax, for which payroll 
is the exclusive FA factor, interprets correlations between tax rates and payroll costs as 
evidence for a distortion in real business activity (e.g., Riedel, 2010; Thomsen, 
Ullmann, & Watrin, 2014). An important assumption in this research is that FA tax 
                                                 
1  An exception is the simulation of Altshuler and Grubert (2010). However, due to the lack of empirical 
research on FA, their simulations are not based on empirically-based estimates but on hypothesized 
tax elasticities. 
2 
effects are not caused by “artificial” tax avoidance strategies (Clausing, 2013; Martini, 
Niemann, & Simons, 2012; Riedel & Runkel, 2007). Clausing and Lahav (2011) argue, 
“While accounting manipulations can easily shift profits of low-tax countries under a 
SA system, that is not the case under a formulary system.” By contrast, the German 
practitioner literature documents a wide range of tax avoidance strategies for the FA 
system of the German local business tax (Dietrich & Krakowiak, 2009; Scheffler, 2011; 
Urbahns, 2010). A primary method of these strategies is the manipulation of the 
distribution of payroll expenses among business units, which is the exclusive FA factor 
in the German regime (see Section 2).2 
We address these issues through detailed analysis of the impact of the German local 
business tax’s FA regime on (1) the allocation of real labour input at the extensive and 
intensive margins, (2) spillover effects on investment and output, and (3) tax avoidance 
strategies affecting payroll expense but not real input and/or output. German 
municipalities impose the German local business tax with substantial variation in tax 
rates in the cross section and over time. Our analysis is based on a unique firm panel 
data set with detailed information on the FA factor (payroll expense), real labour input 
(number of employees, number of hours worked), capital input (investment expense), 
and output (sales) at the establishment level. This comprehensive data set provides a 
greater level of detail to our investigation of FA effects on business activity compared to 
existing empirical studies. An additional benefit of our analysis is that payroll expense 
is the only FA factor in the German local business tax. Therefore, we can identify 
spillover effects on output (measured by sales) and capital input (measured by 
investment expense). 
As a preliminary analysis, we confirm existing German research providing evidence for 
a negative correlation between the tax rate differential (difference between the tax rate 
of establishment i and the average tax rate) and payroll expense as the FA factor 
(Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014). While Riedel (2010) and Thomsen et al. (2014) 
are limited to the FA impact on payroll expense, we extend the analysis to three 
different sets of measures: (1) measures of real labour input (number of employees, 
number of hours worked), (2) measures of a manipulation of the payroll expense (ratio 
                                                 
2  For example, businesses may “lease” employees from low-tax establishments to high-tax 
establishments, as such leasing contracts will not increase the FA-relevant payroll expense in high-tax 
municipalities. Further, businesses may “outsource” employees working in high-tax jurisdictions to 
subsidiaries that are not part of the FA scheme. 
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between payroll expense and measures of real input or output) and (3) measures of FA 
spillover effects on related variables (sales and capital investment). We benefit from a 
unique database that provides much more detailed information at the establishment level 
than data used in previous studies. 
Tax effects on payroll expense may operate through different channels, including 
relocation of labour input at the extensive margin (number of employees), relocation of 
labour input at the intensive margin (number of hours worked per employee), and 
manipulation of payroll expense via tax avoidance. Previous research implicitly 
assumes that a significant correlation between payroll expense and the tax rate 
differential implies an impact of the FA tax system on the number of employees 
(reallocation of labour input at the extensive margin). We show in our paper that this 
conclusion may not be correct. While we find a negative correlation of the tax rate 
differential with (a) payroll expense (overall effect) and (b) the number of hours worked 
(labour input at the intensive margin), we do not find a statistically significant 
correlation of the tax rate differential with the number of employees (labour input at the 
extensive margin). This finding supports a new interpretation of the results of Riedel 
(2010) and Thomsen et al. (2014). 
We also find a significant correlation between the tax rate differential and proxy 
variables for (artificial) tax avoidance. Therefore, our research presents indirect 
evidence that the correlation between payroll expense and the tax rate differential is 
driven not only by reallocation of real input factors but also by tax-planning strategies 
that manipulate the payroll expense at the establishment level without affecting the 
production process or the allocation of input factors. This outcome challenges assertions 
in the literature that FA taxation may be robust to aggressive tax avoidance strategies. 
Furthermore, we analyse whether FA tax incentives result not only in a distortion of the 
apportionment factor (payroll expense) but also in spillover effects on establishment-
level capital input. For the small-group sample (firms with fewer than four 
establishments per entity), we find evidence for an FA-driven spillover effect on capital 
investment. Therefore, FA tax effects distort not only labour input but also capital input 
4 
as a complementary production factor.3 This analysis is the first to identify 
corresponding spillover effects. 
Our paper enriches the existing literature in several ways. First, extending the scarce 
literature on firm reactions to FA, we investigate not only the overall FA effect on 
payroll expense but also the different transmission channels of this effect. While the 
U.S.-based literature provides evidence for FA tax effects on employment (Goolsbee & 
Maydew, 2000; Lightner, 1999) and investment (Gupta & Hofmann, 2003; Weiner, 
1996), firm-level evidence on the transmission channels is lacking. Complementing 
existing research using firm-level tax data (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014), we are 
the first to provide evidence of a distortion of real production factors at the firm level. In 
so doing, we find a significant impact on the number of hours worked but not on the 
number of employees. An explanation for this outcome might be the strong legal 
protections for German employees (e.g., dismissal protection regulations; see Forsyth, 
2009; Sá, 2008), which limit the ability of German employers to engage in tax-driven 
labour force adjustments. As a result, FA tax effects on payroll expense do not 
necessarily imply physical reallocation of employees. Taking into account the strong 
employee protection legislation in most European countries (Sá, 2008), similar effects 
might be expected for a CCCTB at the European level. 
Second, this is the first paper to provide evidence for spillover effects of the FA labour 
input distortion on investment. Our results suggest that FA tax regimes may distort not 
only the corresponding FA factors but also other related variables. This finding should 
be relevant for the on-going theoretical debate over which factors are optimal for an FA 
scheme (Anand & Sansing, 2000; Gresik, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2010; Riedel & Runkel, 
2007; Runkel & Schjelderup, 2011). For example, if labour and capital are closely 
correlated as complements, the opportunities for FA tax policy to attract capital 
investment via a low weight on capital as an FA factor would be limited. 
Third, we are the first to analyse whether firms use more or less “artificial” tax 
avoidance strategies under a payroll-based FA regime to manipulate FA factors. 
Whereas it is challenging to find direct evidence for FA tax avoidance, our results on 
                                                 
3  In unreported regressions for firms with only two establishments (two-establishment subsample), we 
also find weak evidence for spillover effects of labor input on output (measured by sales). However, 
this outcome is not robust in our baseline specification and should be interpreted with caution. 
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tax avoidance proxies are consistent with a tax-induced manipulation of payroll expense 
as an FA factor. While the allocation of income among jurisdictions under SA tax 
regimes is strongly affected by multinationals’ profit shifting strategies (Dharmapala, 
2014), FA has been regarded as less vulnerable to tax avoidance practices (Altshuler & 
Grubert, 2010; Clausing, 2013; Clausing, 2016; Clausing & Lahav, 2011; Martini et al., 
2012; Riedel & Runkel, 2007). Taking into account evidence on FA tax avoidance for 
the sales factor in the U.S. (Gupta & Mills, 2002; Klassen & Shackelford, 1998), payroll 
expense may appear to be a particularly suitable and tax planning-robust apportionment 
factor. However, as documented by Buettner, Riedel, and Runkel (2011), firms may use 
the consolidation rules of an FA regime to optimally rely either on FA or on SA (as FA 
is only relevant for consolidated firms). Extending these findings, we generate evidence 
consistent with firms manipulating the distribution of payroll expense under the FA 
scheme to minimize their tax burden. Thus, the introduction of FA will presumably not 
“stop” tax avoidance strategies but rather change tax avoidance techniques. Hence, our 
paper also contributes to the broad literature on tax avoidance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010) via its focus on avoidance mechanisms under an FA scheme. While our paper is 
based on the German FA system, our findings should also be relevant for FA systems of 
other countries (e.g., Canada, Switzerland, U.S.) and for considerations regarding a 
European FA system.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the German local business tax 
and the corresponding FA regulations. Section 3 presents our theoretical considerations 
and hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and the data. The results are 
reported in Section 5. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 6. 
2 The German local business tax and FA 
The domestic business profits of the majority of German firms are subject to a local 
business tax.4 While the German parliament and the Federal Council of Germany enact 
a uniform tax code, each German municipality has the authority to set the local business 
tax rate. The large number of municipalities we consider (12,266 over the sample 
period) guarantees sufficient variation in tax rates for our analysis. The local business 
tax rate is calculated using a uniform basic rate (German: Messzahl, 3.5% since 2008) 
                                                 
4  Exceptions exist for sole proprietorships and partnerships with earnings from agriculture, forestry and 
learned academic professions (e.g., self-employed doctors, tax advisers, architects, engineers). These 
types of businesses are not taxed by the German local business tax. 
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and a variable local business tax multiplier (German: Hebesatz). Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the distribution of local business tax rates in Germany in 2008, which is the 
final year of our data set. We observe considerable variation in tax rates in the cross 
section. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In 2004, a minimum local business tax multiplier of 2 (200%, as described by the 
German Local Business Tax Code) was introduced. The German business tax reform of 
2008/2009 slightly reduced the basic rate from 5% to 3.5% and abolished the tax 
deductibility of the local business tax from taxable profit.5 In the year 2008, local 
business tax rates have typically ranged from 7% (local tax multiplier of 2) to 17.15% 
(local tax multiplier of 4.9). There are very few outliers (current maximum rate is 
31.5%, in Dierfeld). Accounting for the higher basic rate of 5% and the tax deductibility 
of the local business tax from its own tax base, historical tax rates before 2008 were 
slightly higher (9.09% for a tax multiplier of 2 and 19.68% for a local tax multiplier of 
4.9). The local business tax base is a modified firm profit. The most important current 
modification is the nondeductibility of a fraction of interest, leases, and rents paid 
(before 2008, only nondeductibility of a fraction of interest for long-term debt). To 
avoid double taxation, there are also exemptions for distributed profits and dividends. 
For our identification strategy, a crucial feature of the local business tax is the FA 
system with payroll as the exclusive FA factor. For firms with multiple establishments 
in different German municipalities (hereafter, multi-establishment firms), the local 
business tax base is usually apportioned according to the establishments’ payroll 
shares.6 Hence, firms file a partition statement (in German “Zerlegungserklärung”) that 
provides information on the distribution of payroll among establishments in different 
municipalities. In consolidated tax groups, subsidiaries are also treated as 
establishments. The relevant payroll per employee is limited to €50,000 for FA 
purposes. Trainees’ wages, tax-exempt wage payments, and profit-related bonuses are 
disregarded for FA purposes. The local business tax base must be declared to the state 
tax authorities, which calculate and allocate the local business tax and perform random 
                                                 
5  Before 2008, the German local business tax payments therefore reduced the tax base of the (corporate 
and/or personal) income tax and its own tax base. 
6  Under certain conditions (e.g., wind power stations), there are also special apportionment schemes, 
which are not based on payroll expense (Scheffler, 2011). Considering their limited scope of 
application, these special regimes are not relevant for our analysis. 
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tax audits. Usually, tax audits are not conducted by the municipalities but by the 
German states. Therefore, the German fiscal authorities have no strong incentive to 
audit the allocation of local business taxes to different municipalities (Becker & Fuest, 
2010; Gresik, 2010). Anecdotal evidence (Scheffler, 2011) suggests a weak audit 
system for the German FA scheme. 
The German practitioner literature discusses a range of tax avoidance strategies to 
manipulate payroll expense as an FA factor (Dietrich & Krakowiak, 2009; Scheffler, 
2011). To obtain a better understanding of tax avoidance opportunities in the German 
FA system, we rely on a series of qualitative interviews with a focus on tax-planning 
and audit procedures. Overall, we use 19 interviews with tax advisers, business 
taxpayers, staff members of tax authorities and staff members of municipal authorities.7 
Importantly, this qualitative research confirms anecdotal evidence of a weak tax audit 
system for FA purposes. Hence, the fiscal administration and the municipal authorities 
have only very limited opportunities to check the validity of the payroll distribution 
reported in a firm’s partition statement. This is partially driven by the fact that firms’ 
central offices administer employee contracts, while the establishment is not a legally 
distinct entity. As a result, there exist no official documents on the workplaces of 
employees and no official accounts on the distribution of payroll among establishments.  
Using the tax practitioner literature, as well as the findings of our own qualitative 
research, we were able to identify tax-planning strategies for FA factor manipulation. 
One example for such tax planning is that an establishment in a low-tax municipality 
leases employees to other establishments or subsidiaries of the same firm group that are 
located in high-tax municipalities. The other business units pay a leasing fee for the 
employees. However, this leasing fee is not considered a payroll expense under German 
FA rules. As a result, the FA-relevant payroll expense is paid in a low-tax municipality, 
while the hours worked are performed in a high-tax municipality. This increases 
(reduces) the weight of low-tax (high-tax) municipalities in the FA formula. 
In many practical cases, tax avoidance “techniques” might be much simpler than the 
leasing scheme. A main driver is the information asymmetry between the tax 
authority/municipality and the business taxpayer. As it is extremely difficult for German 
authorities to check information in FA partition statements, firms might simply 
                                                 
7  Marcel Zander conducted the interviews as part of a related project. We are very thankful to Marcel 
Zander for supporting this research. 
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“officially” reallocate payroll expense across different establishments. Payroll is 
typically paid by the headquarters and not by the establishment itself, while employees 
may be active in more than one establishment. Hence, a staff member might effectively 
work at one establishment but officially be paid by another establishment. Note that 
such “errors” are not necessarily regarded as illegal or tax fraud. They might simply be 
regarded as accounting errors or discretion.  
A further opportunity is that establishments in high-tax municipalities buy business 
services from low-tax establishments. This strategy has similar implications to the 
leasing scheme. While employees are officially employed in low-tax establishments, 
they are effectively working in high-tax municipalities. Such outsourcing is not relevant 
for FA and increases the weight of low-tax establishments in the FA scheme. The 
identified FA tax-planning strategies are consistent with evidence on tax-motivated cost 
allocation (Yetman, 2001). As an alternative, employees might also be outsourced to 
subsidiaries, which are not part of the FA regime (non-consolidation for FA tax 
purposes) and can therefore be used for profit shifting in an SA context. 
From an empirical perspective, the German local business tax has a number of notable 
advantages when testing the impact of FA systems on real business activity. First, the 
German local business tax uses payroll expense as the single FA factor, which 
simplifies the analysis and permits the identification of spillover effects on investment 
and sales. Second, the Local Business Tax Code is uniform in all German 
municipalities. Therefore, we may focus simply on the variation in tax rates to identify 
the impact of FA on the allocation of labour input. Third, we observe substantial 
variation in tax rates over time and in the cross section. Tax rates range from 0% (before 
2004) to more than 30% over the period considered. On average, approximately 8% of 
the 12,266 municipalities change their local business tax rate each year, providing 
sufficient variation in tax rates over time. This is documented in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
3 Theory and hypotheses 
As McLure (1981) suggests, income taxes raised by FA can be interpreted as taxes on 
the corresponding FA factors. In the case of Germany, payroll expense is the only FA 
factor. Thus, the average local business tax rate   of a multi-establishment firm is the 
weighted sum of tax rates i , with the payroll share of an establishment i as the 
weighting factor. Corresponding to the theoretical literature (Anand & Sansing, 2000; 
9 
Gordon & Wilson, 1986; Nielsen et al., 2010), the tax rate will distort the FA factor cost 
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   with the aggregate number 
of establishments J). 
We use the tax rate differential TaxDi as a measure of FA tax incentives. TaxDi is 
defined as the difference between the tax rate of establishment i, i , and the unweighted 














 .8 Since a positive (negative) tax rate differential creates an 
incentive to shift payroll from (into) the establishment, we hypothesize: 
H1:  The Payroll share of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the tax rate 
differential. 
While the literature (e.g., Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014) interprets the correlation 
between Payroll share and the tax rate differential solely as evidence for a reallocation 
of real labour inputs, this is not the only possible response from taxpayers. As Dietrich 
and Krakowiak (2009), Urbahns (2010), Scheffler (2011) and our own qualitative 
research demonstrate, there is a wide range of FA tax avoidance strategies that affect 
payroll expense without changing real labour inputs. Further, existing evidence does not 
provide information on the channels involved in a reallocation of production factors at 
the firm level (Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; Gupta & Hofmann, 2003; Lightner, 1999; 
Riedel, 2010). To identify the impact of the German FA local business tax regime on 
real labour inputs, we rely on measures of labour input at the extensive and intensive 
margins. 
Similar to Payroll share, we use the share of employees at establishment i to the total 
number of employees (Employee share) as a measure of labour input at the extensive 
margin. For labour input at the intensive margin, we use the ratio of hours worked per 
                                                 
8  Riedel (2010) uses a weighted tax rate differential with sales as a weighting factor. However, in our 
study, such a measure would not be appropriate because we further consider spillover effects on sales 
and investments. Thus, sales might also be distorted by FA tax incentives. In addition, it remains 
questionable if FA tax incentives are better represented by a weighted tax rate differential or by an 
unweighted tax rate differential, as in our case. 
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While this ratio is not a “share” in the true sense, it is a relative measure ranging from 
zero to 1. Thus, it has similar statistical properties (e.g., mean, standard error; see Table 
4) to our “share” measures (Payroll share, Employee share), which simplifies the 
comparability of regression results. We assume that both measures of real labour input 
are negatively affected by the shifting incentive measured by the tax rate differential. 
H2a:  The Employee share of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the tax 
rate differential. 
H2b:  The Hours per employee ratio of an establishment i is negatively correlated with 
the tax rate differential. 
In addition, we analyse spillover effects of labour inputs on output and capital input. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with output (sales)  ;i i iS L K  






   
, an adjustment of labour input Li will result in a corresponding 
adjustment of output Si and capital input Ki. For example, if German FA tax incentives 
reduce labour input, we should also observe a reduction in output and capital input. 
Since the German FA scheme does not consider sales or capital stock as FA factors, 
both proxies for real business activity should be unaffected by tax avoidance strategies 
intended to manipulate the FA factor (payroll expense). 
We identify these indirect effects of the German FA regime by investigating the 
correlation between TaxD and Sales share (ratio of the sales of establishment i to the 
total sales of the firm) as well as TaxD and Investment share (ratio of gross investment 
in equipment and real estate at establishment i to the total gross investment of the firm). 
As profits from foreign operations may be tax-exempt under certain conditions,9 Sales 
share is based on sales from domestic operations. However, we also perform a 
robustness check that includes sales from both domestic and foreign operations. 
                                                 
9  Corresponding to § 2 of the German Local Business Tax Code (German: Gewerbesteuergesetz), the 
tax is relevant only for ongoing business operations in Germany.  
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Investment share is based on gross investment, since our database does not provide 
information on the capital stock at the establishment level. Investment share also 
accounts for leasing contracts for new equipment and real estate. We assume that these 
secondary spillover effects of TaxD via labour input are delayed by one period. 
Therefore, we use the lagged value of TaxD in both cases. 
H3a:  The Sales share of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the once-
lagged tax rate differential. 
H3b:  The Investment share of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the 
once-lagged tax rate differential. 
Finally, we also analyse tax avoidance strategies of German businesses manipulating the 
distribution of the FA factor without changing the real factor allocation. We assume that 
tax avoidance will affect payroll expense while leaving real labour input or output 
unchanged. Therefore, we investigate correlations between the tax rate differential and 
the ratio of payroll expense to real labour input or output. Following the approach of the 
Hours per employee ratio, we use the following two measures. 
We use first the ratio of payroll expense per hours worked of establishment i to the sum 
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second, the ratio of payroll expense per unit of sales of establishment i to the sum of 















An assumption of our identification strategy is that measures of real input and output 
(hours worked, sales) are not affected or manipulated by tax avoidance practices. As 
suggested by the tax practitioner literature and our own qualitative research, we expect 
that German businesses adjust their tax avoidance strategies to tax rate changes without 
a significant time delay and hypothesize a negative correlation with the current tax rate 
differential: 
H4a:  The Payroll per hour ratio of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the 
tax rate differential. 
12 
H4b:  The Payroll per sales ratio of an establishment i is negatively correlated with the 
tax rate differential. 
4 Empirical strategy and data 
In our empirical tests, we regress payroll expense at the establishment level on tax rate 
differentials to test H1. We use the share of payroll expense of establishment i of the 





 ). A benefit of this scaled variable is that it should not 
be affected by general payroll changes at the firm level that are unrelated to the 
allocation of payroll across establishments. The Payroll share of establishment i in year 
t is regressed on the tax rate differential TaxDit as a measure of the tax incentive and 
covariates 
0 1 2              it it it it t i itPayroll share TaxD E D u  (1) 
with the error term itu . TaxDit is defined as documented in Section 3 (for the definition 
of variables, see also Table 1). We consider year fixed effects t to account for 
economic trends and shocks and establishment fixed effects i to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the establishments. Thus, our identification strategy relies on changes 
in the tax rate differential. 
Eit-2 is a vector of establishment controls encompassing twice-lagged Sales shareit-2 and 
Investment shareit-2 to account for the growth of establishments and changes in 
establishment size. If current payroll is associated with future payroll (as we safely can 
assume), then unobserved factors may confound the association between tax incentives 
and payroll variables. For example, there might be a positive trend in the payroll 
expense of an establishment and simultaneously a positive trend in tax rates over time 
that could confound the expected negative impact of taxes on Payroll shareit.  
We use second lags instead of first lags for establishment controls. As local business tax 
rate changes may be announced and anticipated, controlling for first lags may lead to 
inconsistent regression results. As an example, consider a tax reform in a municipality 
increasing TaxDit. If this reform is previously announced and/or anticipated, it could 
also affect Investment shareit-1. In such a setting, Investment shareit-1 would be 
correlated with TaxDit and therefore endogenous. Thus, controlling for Investment 
shareit-1 would block a causal path (impact of the reform on Investment shareit-1) and 
lead to inconsistent regression results.  
13 
Nickell (1981) shows that panel models with lagged dependent variables as controls 
provide inconsistent regression results if individual fixed effects are included (in our 
case establishment fixed effects). To account for this bias, we abstain from including 
(twice-) lagged dependent variables as right-hand-side variables throughout the paper. 
Dit is a vector of control variables at the district level that includes unemployment (local 
unemployment rate in percentage points), GDP per capita (logarithm of price-adjusted 
GDP per capita in euros) and population (logarithm of the number of inhabitants) in a 
district.10 For district-level information, regional economic development is not 
significantly affected by developments at the establishment level. Therefore, 
endogeneity should be a minor issue for district information. Hypotheses H2a through 
H4b are tested by regression models corresponding to (1).   
As dependent variables Yit, we use Employee shareit for H2a, Hours per employee ratioit 
for H2b, Sales shareit for H3a, Investment shareit for H3b, Payroll per hour ratioit for 
H4a and Payroll per sales ratioit for H4b. Since we assume delayed spillover effects, we 
use a once-lagged TaxDit-1 for Sales shareit and Investment shareit. Accounting for a 
potential “Nickell bias”, we do not include twice-lagged values of the dependent 
variable as establishment controls in models with Sales shareit and Investment shareit as 
dependent variables. Instead, we include twice-lagged Payroll shareit-2. Thus, for 
Investment shareit (Sales shareit) as the dependent variable, establishment controls are 
Sales shareit-2 (Investment shareit-2) and Payroll shareit-2. Documentation on the 
regression variables can be found in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
A problem for our analysis stems from the ambiguity of tax avoidance incentives for 
firms with a large number of establishments. For example, a firm with five 
establishments, one of which is in a high-tax municipality, has the opportunity to shift 
payroll expense from the high-tax establishment to four other establishments, as well as 
among these four other establishments. In a world without non-tax costs, the firm would 
simply reallocate payroll to the establishment with the lowest local business tax rate. 
However, the reallocation of payroll generates non-tax costs (e.g., costs associated with 
                                                 
10  Apart from the municipality, the district (“Kreis”) is the smallest regional administrative body in 
Germany. For German cities, the district is often identical to the municipality (in German “kreisfreie 
Städte”). This holds for all larger German cities and for small, regionally important German cities 
(e.g., Ansbach, Gera, Magdeburg, Straubing). Hence, controlling for changes in economic trends at 
the district level is well suited to our identification strategy. 
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production inefficiency) and tax avoidance costs (e.g., tax adviser fees, tax avoidance 
risk), which are not observable in our data. In addition, alternative tax avoidance 
strategies (e.g., from the implicit option between SA and FA as discussed by Buettner et 
al., 2011) should be more valuable for larger entities with a typically large number of 
establishments. Therefore, the identification of FA tax effects is more difficult for firms 
with a larger number of establishments. Accordingly, our main focus is on a subsample 
with a low number of establishments. To account for different payroll shifting 
incentives for firms with many establishments and to generate subsamples of sufficient 
size, we employ a subsample of entities with up to three establishments (small-group 
sample, 52,542 observations) and a subsample of entities with four or more 
establishments (large-group sample, 38,136 observations). The small-group sample 
should be best suited for a detailed analysis of the various FA effects. The large-group 
sample, however, may suffer from downward bias due to measurement error associated 
with the tax incentive variable. 
As database, we use the German AFiD panel (German: Amtliche Firmendaten in 
Deutschland) for the manufacturing and mining industries11, which represents 
approximately one-quarter of the gross value added of the German economy (Destatis, 
2015). The AFiD panel comprises several mandatory business surveys conducted by the 
German Federal Statistical Office (German: Statistisches Bundesamt) and can be 
accessed by remote-data processing (Malchin & Voshage, 2009). The surveys in 
question, conducted between 1995 and 2008, are the Investment Survey and the 
Monthly Report for Manufacturing and Mining Enterprises (both conducted at the 
establishment level).12 We rely on the Monthly Report for payroll expense, number of 
employees, and the number of hours worked per establishment; we rely on the 
Investment Survey for investment in equipment and real estate at the establishment 
level.  
The definition of establishments in the database is very close to that under German tax 
law. Thus, we can rule out the possibility that subsidiaries of a firm group are regarded 
as establishments in our data. Using the German Statistics of Tax Multipliers (German: 
                                                 
11  The official title of the data is “Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the 
statistical offices of the Länder, AFiD panel for the manufacturing and mining industries, 1995-2008”; 
see also http://www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/bestand/afid-panel_industriebetriebe/index.asp.  
12  The German titles of the surveys are as follows: "Investitionserhebung bei Betrieben des 
Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden" and "Monatsbericht bei 
Betrieben des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden". 
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Statistik der Hebesätze) and Regio-Stat information, we complement these data with 
local business tax rates at the municipality level and information on the economic 
situation at the district level (GDP per capita, population, unemployment rate). This 
provides us with a unique panel of establishment data covering the period from 1995 to 
2008. 
Compared to other firm panels such as Compustat or AMADEUS, AFiD possesses a 
number of major advantages for our analysis. Unlike public accounting data, the 
Investment Survey and the Monthly Report provide very detailed information on the 
volume and composition of payrolls, investments, and sales, and these data are collected 
at the establishment level. Since we complement the data with information on local 
business tax rates, we are able to analyse not only correlations between payroll expense 
and tax rates but also correlations with number of employees, number of hours worked 
per employee, sales, gross investment, and measures of tax avoidance (payroll per 
number of hours worked, payroll per unit of sales) at the establishment and firm levels. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is a unique feature, allowing us to conduct a much 
more detailed analysis than in previous research. Both surveys are conducted as a 
mandatory census of all domestic establishments in the manufacturing and mining 
industries with at least 20 employees; therefore, non-response and sample selection are 
not issues. An additional advantage stems from the fact that the data are anonymized 
and available only for political and scientific use. Hence, there should be a lesser 
incentive for survey participants to “massage the numbers” than in balance sheet 
information. 
A disadvantage of the data is that it does not provide information on firm ownership or 
holding structures. Thus, we obtain data for the various establishments of one entity but 
not for subsidiaries or parent companies of that entity. While the data should be 
excellently suited to analyse factor allocations within a legally distinct entity, they do 
not enable us to address FA tax incentives in group taxation regimes. As described by 
Section 2, subsidiaries in consolidated group structures can be regarded as 
establishments under certain requirements for purposes of the German local business tax 
(see Buettner et al., 2011). In addition, we are not able to identify other forms of tax 
avoidance among different legally distinct entities of a consolidated group (e.g., profit 
shifting between different legal entities). Further, the data are restricted to the 
manufacturing industry and the mining sector, and they provide information only on 
gross investment but not on the capital stock. 
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The original data include 691,822 observations from the period 1995–2008 for business 
establishments that participated in the Investment Survey and the Monthly Report and 
provide both firm and establishment IDs. In a first step, we exclude all firms with only a 
single establishment, as FA incentives are exclusively relevant for multi-establishment 
business units. As mentioned before, the data do not permit the identification of FA tax 
incentives of consolidated group structures. Second, we drop all observations with 
missing information on our variables (including lagged variables). Our final sample 
comprises 90,678 observations of multi-jurisdictional establishments in the German 
manufacturing and mining sectors. Given that we use twice-lagged control variables, we 
lose two observation years. Thus, we effectively rely on the time period 1997–2008. 
Table 2 shows the number of firms and the number of establishments for the full sample 
(Panel A) and the small-group sample (Panel B). In the full sample (small-group 
sample) the average number of establishments per firm is 3.12 (2.21).  
[Table 2 about here] 
In Table 3, we display the development of tax rates over time. During the period 1997–
2007, we observe a small but steady increase in the average local business tax rate. The 
2008 tax reform led to a general tax cut, mainly due to a reduction of the basic rate from 
5% to 3.5% (see Section 2). As this 2008 tax cut is linear for every municipality, it 
should not jeopardize our identification strategy. The majority of local business tax rate 
changes are increases. The average tax increase is 0.69 percentage points, which is 
4.46% of the average tax rate. However, during the period 1997–2007, we still find, on 
average, 153 local business tax rate cuts per year. The average tax cut is 0.65 percentage 
points, which is 4.18% of the average tax rate. 
[Table 3 about here]  
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of the price-adjusted 
establishment data. For price adjustment to the year 2005, we use the German producer 
price index for the manufacturing industry (German Council of Economic Experts, 
2011). Due to the confidentiality policies of the German Federal Statistical Office, we 
are not allowed to report maximum and minimum values. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The descriptive statistics indicate significant variance and a skewed distribution of 
establishment size. While the average price-adjusted sales per establishment amount to 
€38.9 million, the median is only €6.7 million. On average, establishments spent 
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approximately 9% of sales on gross investment and approximately 22% on payroll 
expense. The average number of employees (approximately 319) and the median 
number of employees (approximately 82) document the size of the establishments. Note 
that employee numbers are reported on a monthly basis in our data. Therefore, the 
median value of 82 describes the median of the average number of employees in an 
establishment over the whole year. On average, each employee works 135.5 hours per 
month. Descriptive statistics for the tax rate differential show a relatively equal 
distribution of positive and negative tax incentives over the 90,678 establishments. The 
average TaxD is almost zero, and the number of observations with positive TaxD is very 
close to the number of observations with negative TaxD. For the various “share” and 
“ratio” variables of H1 through H4b, we find similar statistical properties. Mean values 
range from 32.8% (Payroll per sales ratio) to 35.1% (Payroll share) and standard 
deviations from 20.0% (Investment share) to 32.3% (Payroll per sales ratio). 
[Table 5 about here] 
Descriptive statistics of the small-group sample (< 4 establishments) and the remaining 
large-group sample (≥ 4 establishments) are provided in Table 5. Establishments in both 
subsamples are very similar to one another with respect to monthly hours worked per 
employee, the local business tax rate, the tax rate differential, and regional economic 
characteristics (e.g., unemployment rates). Differences exist for establishment size and 
the allocation of input and output variables among different business units. 
Establishments of large-group firms are larger in terms of sales, gross investment and 
payroll expense. Further, driven by the higher number of establishments, mean values of 
our relative “share” and “ratio” variables are smaller. Due to the greater heterogeneity in 
the large-group sample, the standard deviations of our regression variables (e.g., Payroll 
share) are relatively high compared to mean values. 
5 Results 
5.1 FA effects on payroll expense 
As a first step, we estimate regression model (1) to confirm existing evidence of a 
negative and significant correlation between the tax rate differential (TaxD) and Payroll 
share (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014). In so doing, we address the question of 
whether the correlation becomes more obvious for the subsample of firms with few 
establishments (small-group sample). Therefore, we estimate (1) for a) the full sample, 
b) the small-group sample (< 4 establishments), and c) the large-group sample (≥ 4 
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establishments). We also estimate models for the full sample including an interaction 
term of TaxD and a measure of group size. Hence, we test whether tax effects in the 
large-group sample differ significantly from the results of the small-group sample. As 
variables for group size, we consider a dummy variable for the small-group sample 
(Small group), the number of establishments (Establishments), and the logarithm of the 
number of establishments (LN(Establishments)). The group-size-specific tax effect is 
identified by the interaction term of group size and TaxD (e.g., TaxD x Small group).  
Estimations are performed by ordinary least squares (OLS) with establishment and year 
fixed effects. We use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, which are clustered at 
the establishment level (so-called Rogers standard errors). We report the within R2 and 
the adjusted R2.13 In contrast to the within R2, the adjusted R2 also considers the 
explanatory power of the establishment fixed effects. Thus, for the calculation of 
adjusted R2, establishment fixed effects are interpreted as control variables as suggested 
by Equation (1). The results are reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Confirming findings from the literature (Riedel, 2010; Thomsen et al., 2014) and H1, 
we obtain a negative and significant correlation between TaxD and Payroll share. 
Corresponding to our estimate for the full sample (1), increasing TaxD by 1 percentage 
point reduces Payroll share by 0.43 percentage points. While we obtain a somewhat 
higher coefficient for the small-group sample (-0.678), there is no evidence for a TaxD 
effect for the large-group sample. Thus, TaxD has less explanatory power for firms with 
a large number of establishments. Nevertheless, the models that include interaction 
terms do not provide significant evidence of stronger FA effects for firms with a low 
number of establishments. While the coefficient of TaxD remains stable in models (4) to 
(6) in Table 6, none of the tested interaction terms is significant. 
Calculating semi-elasticities, the results of models (4) to (6) are well in line with the 
coefficients of TaxD in models (1) and (2). Based on a simulation of payroll shifting 
between establishments (see Appendix A), we find that a one-percentage-point increase 
in the tax rate of establishment i reduces the payroll expense of i by 1.36% (small-group 
sample) or 1.29% (full sample). This suggests an average payroll reduction of 
                                                 
13  All estimates and the within R2 are calculated with the Stata® xtreg command. The xtreg command is 
more conservative for clustered standard errors than the areg command. As the xtreg command does 
not calculate adjusted R2, we used the areg command for calculating the reported adjusted R2 only. 
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establishment i of €87,846 (small-group sample) or €110,920 (full sample), which is 
shifted to the other establishment j if the local business tax rate for i is increased by one 
percentage point. These estimates should be interpreted carefully as they depend on the 
assumptions of our simulation approach. Concluding, the results of Table 6 suggest that 
FA tax effects can be more easily identified in the small-group sample. However, 
considering the elasticity estimates and insignificant interaction terms of TaxD and 
group size, the models do not generate evidence of a difference in FA tax effects 
between the small-group sample and the large-group sample. 
5.2 Factor allocation, spillover effects, and tax avoidance 
Let us now turn to our main analysis of FA effects on factor allocation and tax 
avoidance. As described in Section 3, we use six variables as measures of FA effects on 
business activity. While FA effects on real labour input at the extensive margin and at 
the intensive margin are measured by Employee share and Hours per employee ratio, 
FA spillover effects on output and investment are considered through Sales share and 
Investment share. Finally, tax avoidance strategies affecting payroll expense without 
affecting real labour input or output are identified by Payroll per hour ratio and by 
Payroll per sales ratio. Considering Table 6, our main focus is on the small-group 
sample with the more robust regression results for Payroll share. The results are 
provided in Table 7. Notwithstanding, we also report results for the full sample (see 
Table 8). As documented in Table 6, there is no evidence of a TaxD effect for the large-
group sample. Hence, we abstain from reporting results. 
[Table 7 about here] 
While the TaxD coefficient on Employee share in Table 7 is insignificant, the value of 
the TaxD coefficient on Hours per employee ratio of -0.634 is close to that of the TaxD 
coefficient on Payroll share and significant. Hence, we generate empirical evidence for 
an impact of FA on real labour inputs at the establishment level. This effect is driven by 
an adjustment of hours worked. We do not find evidence that the effect is driven by an 
adjustment of the labour force (as suggested by Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; Lightner, 
1999). This outcome is robust for many different specifications including regressions 
for the full sample (Table 8) and robustness checks (Subsection 5.3). Thus, our evidence 
does not support the interpretation of Riedel (2010) and Thomsen et al. (2014) that the 
impact of the German FA scheme on Payroll share is mainly driven by adjustments of 
the number of employees.  
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A potential explanation for our finding is the institutional structure of the German 
labour market. Compared to the U.S., Germany has strong employment protection rules 
for businesses with at least 10 employees. In addition, unions have a strong position in 
the German labour market, and worker participation is an important aspect of the 
German corporate governance system (Forsyth, 2009; Sá, 2008). Thus, it may well be 
that the German labour force is not flexible enough to be strongly affected by an FA tax 
incentive. 
Regarding FA spillover effects, we use once-lagged TaxD as the dependent variable to 
account for a delay of the indirect effects. We calculate an insignificant coefficient for 
Sales share and a negative and significant coefficient for Investment share. Hence, 
while we find evidence for spillover effects of labour input on investment, the results 
for spillover effects on output are inconclusive.14 Our findings suggest that labour and 
capital are, on average, complementary input factors.  
The negative and significant coefficient estimates for Payroll per hour ratio and Payroll 
per sales ratio are consistent with our theoretical argument that firms may rely on more 
or less artificial tax avoidance strategies to optimize Payroll share as the relevant FA 
factor. The results in Table 7 suggest that firms have two ways to react to FA tax 
incentives in the German local business tax. First, they adjust real labour inputs (such as 
the number or working hours) with spillover effects on investment activity. As such 
reallocation strategies lead to a distortion of the production process, they should be 
connected with significant costs. Second, firms also seek alternative (artificial) ways to 
adjust Payroll share without changing or distorting the production process.  
Comparing the regression coefficients for Payroll per sales ratio (1.271) and Payroll 
per hours ratio (-0.546) in the small-group sample with the coefficient for Hours per 
employee ratio (-0.634) indicates that tax avoidance may be responsible for a significant 
part of the overall impact of TaxD on Payroll share.15 However, considering that 
                                                 
14  In an unreported cross-check, we also tested the impact of TaxD on Sales share only for firms with 
two establishments (two-establishment subsample with 38,126 observations). In these regressions, we 
obtain a negative regression coefficient, which is significant at the 10% level. However, the 
corresponding results are not robust if we consider the small-group sample or the full sample. 
15  One might argue that part of the lower Payroll per hour ratio might be due to a reduction in overtime 
hours and the corresponding overtime compensation. Taking into account that a one-percentage-point 
increase in the tax rate reduces the Hours per employee ratio by 0.634 percentage points and the 
Payroll per hour ratio by almost the same value (0.546 percentage points), the impact of overtime 
compensation should be almost negligible. Adjusting hours worked by a small amount (e.g., 0.6%) 
will not result in a notable change in the average payroll over all hours worked. Even for an extremely 
 
21 
Payroll per sales ratio and Payroll per hours ratio are not perfect measures for tax 
avoidance practices, the relative sizes of both effects should be interpreted carefully. For 
example, these measures are not adequate to account for all tax avoidance practices 
(e.g., the use of profit shifting instead of a manipulation of the FA factor). We conclude 
that both strategies (changes in the allocation of real labour inputs, tax avoidance 
practices) should be relevant.  
Based on the approach presented in Appendix A, we are able to provide a quantitative 
interpretation of the results in Table 7. In our calculations, we generally assume that 
payrolls and investments are shifted from the high-tax establishment to the low-tax 
establishment. We find that an increase in the tax rate differential by one percentage 
point reduces business investment by 1.04% (or €31,282 on average in 2016 prices), the 
number of hours worked per employee by 1.27% (or the number of working hours per 
employee and month by 1.7 hours), the ratio of payroll expense to sales by 2.54%, and 
the ratio of payroll per hour by 1.09%. Taking into account that the impact of the hours 
per employee and the impact of the payroll per hour enforce each other, we obtain an 
overall tax effect on payroll of -2.35% as an upper bound estimate.  
Considering our regression results in Table 6 (lower bound estimate), our findings 
suggest that the semi-elasticity of TaxD with regard to payroll expense for the small-
group sample lies in a range from -1.36% to -2.35%. Due to methodological differences, 
a comparison of this range with existing German research is not straightforward. We 
concentrate on Riedel (2010), as the paper by Thomsen et al. (2014) is a work in 
progress and reports a very wide range of estimates. Including all control variables, 
Riedel (2010) finds a semi-elasticity for the payroll to capital ratio of -1.85%. Assuming 
a constant capital stock, this can be interpreted as a rough estimate of the tax impact on 
payroll. This estimate fits very well with the average of our lower bound estimate and 
our upper bound estimate for the small-group sample (-1.85% = (-1.36% + -2.35%)/2) 
and is slightly higher than our estimate from Table 6 for the full sample (-1.29%).16 
Considering the differences between data sets and regression techniques, our estimate is 
therefore well in line with existing evidence.  
                                                                                                                                               
high overtime compensation of 100%, a 0.6% change in hours worked will result in a change in 
average payroll per hour worked of only 0.006%. 
16  Taking into account the relatively weak empirical evidence in Table 8 as well as the identification 
problems of tax incentives for firms with a high number of establishments, we abstain from 
calculating quantitative estimates for the regression coefficients of Table 8. 
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An alternative explanation for a tax-driven reduction in payroll expense, without a 
corresponding change in the underlying real input measure (number of hours worked) or 
output measure (sales), is tax incidence. According to the economic and public finance 
literature, businesses may impose the local business tax burden on their employees by 
reducing gross wages. While there is some empirical evidence of corresponding effects 
(Fuest, Peichl, & Siegloch, 2013; Siegloch, 2014), strong empirical and theoretical 
arguments suggest that incidence should not be the main driver of the observed tax 
impact on the Payroll per hour ratio and the Payroll per sales ratio in our setting.  
First, the speed of the tax-driven adjustment process of payroll expense appears too 
rapid to be attributable to tax incidence. We find stronger effects of current TaxD on 
payroll than of lagged TaxD.17 Hence, an increase in the local business tax rate in one 
year reduces the payroll expense of that establishment in the same year. However, 
shifting tax burdens of the employer to the employees via a reduction in gross wages 
would require time, as employee contracts need to be renegotiated (Fuest et al., 2013; 
Siegloch, 2014). As employees have a contractual entitlement to their wage payment, it 
seems quite unrealistic that employees would accept a considerable reduction in their 
gross wage to save tax payments for their employer. By contrast, the tax avoidance 
strategies documented by Section 2 would allow an immediate “reduction” of payroll 
expense in high-tax municipalities, as they simply require a reallocation of payroll in the 
FA partition statement. 
Second, Fuest et al. (2013) argue that due to collective rent dividing negotiations, the 
tax burden is particularly shifted to workers under collective wage agreements. Hence, 
we would expect a stronger tax effect on the Payroll per hour ratio and the Payroll per 
sales ratio for firms with many establishments. However, we do not observe this pattern 
in our results. Note that Fuest et al. (2013) perform calculations for payroll per 
employee and not for payroll per hours worked. Thus, their calculations might be biased 
by changes in the number of hours worked, as suggested by Table 7 and Table 8 of our 
paper. 
Third, the size of the tax-induced impact on the Payroll per hour ratio appears too 
strong to be explained by tax incidence. Corresponding to model (5) in Table 7, a one-
                                                 
17  This is demonstrated by a comparison of our baseline regression results in Table 6 (Payroll share), 
Table 7, and Table 8 (other dependent variables) with the corresponding results for lagged TaxD in 
Table 9 (Payroll share) and Table 12 (other dependent variables). 
23 
percentage-point increase in the local business tax rate reduces the Payroll per hour 
ratio by 0.546. Calculating the tax effects for a firm with two equal pre-tax 
establishments (see Appendix A), the tax incidence hypothesis suggests a reduction of 
the hourly payroll of 2.16% resulting from a one-percentage-point increase in TaxD. In 
the two-establishment case, the semi-elasticity on payroll for the tax incidence 
hypothesis is therefore nearly twice the estimated semi-elasticity for the tax avoidance 
hypothesis.18 Thus, a five-percentage-point increase in the local business tax rate for 
establishment i implies a reduction of hourly wages in the same year by 10.34%. 
Considering the bargaining power of unions and industry councils, especially in the 
German industrial sector, such a strong tax incidence effect is not convincing. 
Furthermore, the savings from such a strong reduction in gross wages would by far 
exceed the increase in local business tax payments. Corresponding to our calculations in 
Appendix A, an increase in the local business tax burden of a corporation would lead to 
an after-tax reduction of wage costs by approximately €7.20. Hence, the tax incidence 
hypothesis suggests that the reduction in wages due to tax incidence would 
overcompensate for the additional tax burden on a firm by more than 7 times.19 By 
contrast, the tax avoidance hypothesis suggests that the maximum tax saving should be 
much smaller than the additional burden resulting from an increase in TaxD by one 
percentage point. For example, if we assume an ex-ante TaxDi of 3% (approximately 
twice the average positive TaxD, see Tables 4 and 5), an ex-ante even distribution of 
payroll between two establishments, and an increase of τi in establishment i by one 
percentage point, the tax saving from payroll shifting would be less than 5% of the 
additional tax burden. The reason is that an increase in τi of one percentage point 
increases the tax burden on approximately 50% of the profits of the firm (approximately 
                                                 
18  The reason is the relative nature of the Payroll per hour ratio. Under the tax avoidance hypothesis, the 
tax impact on this variable is driven not only by reduced payroll at establishment i but also by an 
increase in payroll at establishment j. By contrast, the incidence hypothesis implies that the payroll at 
the establishment j will not be affected by an increase in the tax rate facing establishment i. Hence, 
there must be a stronger tax effect on the payroll expense at establishment i. 
19  This is primarily driven by the fact that the average ratio between the payroll expense and the tax base 
of the local business tax (an adjusted pre-tax profit) from 1997 to 2008 was approximately 4.08 in the 
German manufacturing industry. For this calculation, we use representative balance sheet data for the 
manufacturing sector reported in the statistical special publication 6 (German: Statistische 
Sonderveröffentlichung 6) of the German Federal Bank. Hence, if the tax burden on profit increases 
by one percentage point, the required reduction in the wage payment would clearly be less than one 
percent, as aggregate wages are much higher than the assessment base of the German local business 
tax. 
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50% share of establishment i), whereas benefits from profit shifting are only relevant for 
the fraction of shifted profits (approximately 5%). 
[Table 8 about here] 
In line with our assumption that we have a more effective identification strategy for our 
small-group sample, we find a smaller number of significant tax effects on measures of 
factor allocation and tax avoidance for the full sample (Table 8). Notwithstanding, the 
general implications of these regressions are largely the same as the results presented in 
Table 7. We obtain negative and significant TaxD-coefficients for the Hours per 
employee ratio (as the measure of real labour input) and the Payroll per sales ratio (as 
the measure of tax avoidance). By contrast, we do not find a significant effect for 
Investment share. Hence, we cannot observe an FA spillover effect on capital stock for 
the large-group sample in comparison to the small-group sample. 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We estimate several additional models to assess the robustness of our findings. 
Robustness checks are calculated for Payroll share (Table 9) and for the variables 
measuring FA effects for factor allocation and tax avoidance (Table 10, Table 11, Table 
12). In these regressions, we consider the small-group sample (panel A) and the full 
sample (panel B). For simplicity, we concentrate on the main variables of interest and 
do not report results for control variables. We report four types of robustness checks.  
First, as already discussed in Section 4, precise shifting incentives are notoriously 
difficult to capture for firms with three or more establishments (Heckemeyer & 
Overesch 2013). In our baseline model, we model the tax incentive at the establishment 
level as the difference between the establishment’s local business tax rate and the 
unweighted average tax rate of the other establishments of the same firm. While we 
know that firms have incentives to shift payroll out of (into) establishments with the 
highest (lowest) local business tax rates, the case is considerably more complicated for 
establishments facing intermediate levels of the tax rate (between the minimum and 
maximum tax rates).  
Consider a firm with three establishments, A, B, C, and local business tax rates of 
A = 10%, B = 14%, and C = 20%. In our standard setting, the tax incentive of 
establishment B is measured as 14% - (10% + 20%)/2 = -1%. Thus, considering shifting 
incentives from both B to A and from C to B, there is a positive but small aggregate 
incentive to shift payroll into establishment B (TaxD = - 1% < 0). An implicit 
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assumption of our measure for the tax rate differential is that the firm considers all 
shifting incentives between the three establishments at the same time. In reality, this 
might be confounded by the complexity of tax avoidance practices, tax avoidance costs 
and legal and factual frictions of tax planning. 
As an alternative, one might argue that the firm concentrates in each case on the largest 
tax rate difference compared to different establishments. In our example, the difference 
of local business tax rates of the establishments A and C is 10%. Thus, the firm will 
save 0.1 € of local business taxes for each 1 € of relocated profits from establishment C 
to establishment A. In case of establishment B, the maximum absolute tax rate 
difference from the other establishments is -6% in relation to establishment C (instead 
of +4% in relation to establishment A). Thus, if we assume that the firm will focus on 
the largest tax avoidance opportunity for each establishment, payroll would be shifted 
from C to B (tax rate difference of -6%). To account for this alternative theory of tax 
avoidance behaviour (focus on the largest shifting incentive for each establishment), we 
define a new measure, TaxMaxD. 
 argmax ,
jt
it it it jtTaxMaxD j i

       (2) 
Subindex i refers to the considered establishment, whereas subindex j refers to the other 
establishments of the same firm. TaxMaxD is defined as the tax benefit of shifting 1 € 
from establishment i to the establishment with the largest tax rate difference compared 
to i (either the minimum or the maximum tax rate of all establishments of a firm). 
Therefore, TaxMaxD accounts for incentives to shift payroll into and out of 
establishments. If TaxMaxD is negative for an establishment, this shows that the 
strongest incentive supports shifting profits into the establishment. In contrast to TaxD, 
TaxMaxD does not account for all shifting opportunities but focuses on the shifting 
channel with the greatest tax savings.  
This can be documented by our example (three establishments with tax rates of 
A = 10%, B = 14%, and C = 20%). The resulting tax incentives are A = -10%, B = -6%, 
and C = 10%. Thus, payroll is shifted from C (positive shifting incentive) to A and B 
(both negative shifting incentives). If we change the local business tax rate of B to 17% 
(with A = 10%, C = 20%), the tax incentives change fundamentally for establishment B. 
Now, the absolute difference between B and C (3%) becomes smaller than the absolute 
difference between A and B (7%). We obtain the following tax rate differentials: A = -
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10%, B = 7%, and C = 10%. Thus, the tax incentive implies that payroll is shifted from 
C and B (both positive shifting incentives) to A (negative shifting incentive). 
We rerun our main regressions with TaxMaxD instead of TaxD. The results are 
documented in Table 9, Model (1) and (2) (Payroll share) and Table 10 (other dependent 
variables). We generally obtain smaller regression coefficients and lower significance 
levels. The positive and significant coefficient for Sales share in the full sample (with 
the largest problems of measurement error) is not very convincing from a theoretical 
perspective. We conclude that TaxMaxD appears to be more strongly affected by 
measurement error than TaxD. Nevertheless, the results obtained using TaxMaxD are 
widely in line with our baseline estimates. Thus, we find evidence for reallocation of 
labour input at the intensive margin and tax avoidance practices and no significant 
evidence for reallocation of employees. 
[Table 9 about here] 
[Table 10 about here] 
Second, we test if our model is robust regarding the exclusion of establishment controls. 
In the main specification, we include twice-lagged establishment controls (typically 
Sales sharet-2 and Investment share t-2) to account for changes and trends in the 
economic activity of an establishment over time (e.g., establishment growth). We 
generally use twice-lagged variables to avoid any endogeneity with the (lagged) tax rate 
differential TaxDt (TaxDt-1). To test the robustness of our baseline model, we exclude 
these control variables. The revised model can be written as 
0 1 .it it it t i itY TaxD D u             (3) 
Estimating this alternative specification, we obtain regression results nearly identical to 
those of our baseline specification (Table 9, Models (3) and (4); Table 11). Thus, our 
model specification appears to be robust with regard to the inclusion of twice-lagged 
control variables accounting for establishment size. In addition, the very high values of 
adjusted R2 in the robustness check suggest that the explanatory power of our baseline 
specification stems mainly from the establishment of fixed effects. Thus, the 
establishment of fixed effects alone can be regarded as a very powerful control variable. 
 [Table 11 about here] 
Third, we test whether the dynamic structure is estimated correctly. It may be argued 
that a change in tax rates has a generally delayed effect for all variables (e.g., Payroll 
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share). In addition, one may argue that spillover effects are not delayed by one year. 
Thus, we consider once-lagged values of TaxD for Payroll share and all other 
dependent variables for which current TaxD is used in the standard regressions. By 
contrast, we consider current TaxD instead of lagged TaxD for Sales share and 
Investment share. The estimated effects (Table 9, Models (5) and (6), Table 12) are 
generally smaller and less significant than those of our standard models. This is 
particularly the case for Investment share. Therefore, our standard regression models 
appear to better consider the temporal dynamics than the robustness test.  
[Table 12 about here] 
Our regression results in Section 5.2 provide estimates for the impact of current (lagged) 
tax rate differentials on current payroll, sales and investment. However, if firms need 
some time to adjust investments or the number of employees, these results may 
underestimate the long-run impact of the German FA system on business activity. To 
acquire a more detailed picture of long-run effects, we use the modelling approach 
described by Wooldridge (2012, p. 346). In this model, the impact of lagged variables 
can be decomposed into the average long-run effect and additional short-run effects of 
lagged parameters. In the following, we assume that the current TaxDt and two lags, 
TaxDt-1, TaxDt-2, will affect the dependent variable (for this approach, see, e.g., Blaufus, 
Hechtner, & Möhlmann, 2017). Assuming that all lags affect the dependent variable and 
following regression (3), we can estimate the model 
0 1 2 1 3 2 .it it it it it t i itY TaxD TaxD TaxD D u                    (4) 
In this model, the long-run effect can be defined by 1 2 3      . Substituting β1 in 
Equation (4) by 2 3     and rearranging terms, we obtain 
   0 2 1 3 2it it it it it it it t i itY TaxD TaxD TaxD TaxD TaxD D u                      (5) 
Thus, we may use Equation (5) to identify the long-run impact of up to two lagged 
values of the tax differential on our dependent variables. As we assume a once-lagged 
tax impact on Sales share and Investment share, we adjust the model for these 
dependent variables and consider TaxDt-1, TaxDt-2, and TaxDt-3 instead of TaxDt, TaxDt-
1, and TaxDt-2. In all models for long-run estimates, we abstain from including twice-
lagged establishment controls Et-2. As documented by our second robustness check in 
5.3 (Table 9, Models (3) and (4); Table 11) including lagged establishment controls 
does not add much to the explanatory power of the model and leads to nearly identical 
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regression results. However, including more lags of establishment controls would make 
the model structure more complex and – more relevantly – reduce the number of usable 
observations. 
We report selected regression results for the small-group sample in Table 13, Panel B. 
In Panel A, we also repeat the short-run regression results of Table 9, Model (3) and 
Table 11 as a reference point for our long-run estimates. Overall, the comparison makes 
clear that long-run estimates do not differ significantly from short-run estimates. The 
only exception is Payroll share, for which we find a slightly larger coefficient of the 
long-run coefficient TaxDθ compared to our standard regression coefficients TaxDt. 
However, considering the standard errors of both coefficient estimates, the differences 
are not statistically significant. In additional unreported tests, we also perform 
regressions corresponding to Equation (4) and consider a higher number of lagged tax 
differentials. The results remain largely unchanged. Overall, we conclude that the long-
run effects of German FA tax incentives do not differ greatly from our baseline 
estimates in Section 5.1. 
[Table 13] 
Furthermore, we perform the following unreported additional robustness checks. Our 
baseline models might be biased by the fact that we only account for sales from 
domestic operations in the dependent variables (e.g., Sales per hour ratio) and control 
variables (e.g., twice-lagged Sales share). Therefore, we perform a robustness check 
accounting for the aggregate sum of sales from domestic operations and sales from 
foreign operations. Our results remain broadly unchanged. In fact, the impact of TaxD 
on the dependent variables (e.g., Payroll per sales ratio) seems to be even slightly 
stronger in these models. In addition, we decompose the tax rate differential into the 
local business tax rate of establishment i and the unweighted average tax rate of the 
firm’s opposite establishments j ≠ i. We regress our variables of interest on the two tax 
rates. We find that a higher average tax rate of the opposite establishments leads to 
significantly higher shifting of payroll into establishment i. Confirming our results, we 
do not find a significant reaction of employee share to variations of the opposite 
establishments’ average tax rate. Nevertheless, these estimates are less robust than our 
baseline specification as the decomposition might introduce errors. 
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6 Conclusion 
We address the question of how multi-establishment firms react to an FA tax regime 
with payroll as the exclusive FA factor. Our analysis is based on a unique panel of 
establishments in the German manufacturing and mining sector. Confirming previous 
firm-level evidence, we find that changes in the tax rate differential are significantly and 
negatively correlated with the allocation of payroll among constituent establishments of 
a firm. Therefore, firms shift payroll away from high-tax establishments to low-tax 
establishments to optimize overall tax burden. Our main focus is on a sample of firms 
with no more than three establishments (small-group sample), as the identification of 
FA tax incentives becomes more difficult for a larger number of establishments. 
Assuming that production factors are shifted between establishments, our findings for 
the small-group sample suggest that an increase in the tax rate differential by one 
percentage point reduces payroll (investment) in the high-tax establishment by 1.36% to 
2.35% (1.04%), with a corresponding increase in the low-tax establishment. Our 
estimates for payroll expense fit quite well with existing evidence (Riedel, 2010). 
Extending the literature, we analyse the impact of FA on the allocation of real labour 
input, spillover effects on investment and output, and tax avoidance strategies. We find 
a significant impact of the German FA regime on labour input at the intensive margin 
(number of hours worked per employee) but not on labour input at the extensive margin 
(number of employees). This outcome may be driven partially by the inflexibility of the 
German labour market (e.g., strong dismissal protection) and is consistent with a limited 
impact of the German FA tax regime on employee recruitment. For the small-group 
sample (< 4 establishments per firm), we also find evidence for spillover effects of the 
payroll-based German FA tax regime on gross investment in equipment and real estate. 
By distorting labour input, FA tax regimes may therefore indirectly distort the capital 
stock, which suggests that both input factors are complements rather than substitutes. 
Thus, our findings suggest that the German FA tax regime has a significant impact on 
the allocation of real production factors. 
Our results are consistent with both tax avoidance and real payroll shifting, as described 
by the German practitioner literature and our own qualitative research. We show that the 
distortion of the FA factor of payroll expense significantly exceeds the distortion of the 
corresponding measures of real input (number of hours worked) and output (sales). 
Hence, firms find ways to manipulate payroll as an FA factor without adjusting real 
business activity. This outcome challenges the assertions in the literature that FA 
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taxation may be robust to aggressive tax avoidance strategies. Introducing FA instead of 
SA for international taxation (e.g., in the form of a CCCTB on the European level) may 
therefore restrict profit shifting but also provide new tax avoidance opportunities in 
addition to real factor allocation. From this perspective, “fine-tuning” international tax 
systems (e.g., by introducing thin-capitalization rules) to narrow tax loopholes may be 
as relevant as the more general question of SA or FA. 
Finally, we note several limitations of our paper. We provide a detailed analysis of the 
German local business tax FA regime for the German manufacturing and mining sector. 
While the manufacturing and mining sector is an important part of the German 
economy, our findings may not be representative of other FA tax regimes and other 
industries (e.g., due to different production processes and investment adjustment costs). 
As mentioned before, measurement of tax incentives by TaxD is not straightforward, 
which should be especially a problem for the full sample and the large-group sample. In 
addition, the external validity of our findings to other countries regarding the 
introduction of a European FA system might be debatable. Note that the German FA 
system relies exclusively on payroll expense as an FA factor. In addition, FA tax effects 
should be related to the structure of the labour market, which is more regulated in 
Germany than in many other countries. 
Nevertheless, we are convinced that our main propositions on FA tax effects on factor 
allocation and tax avoidance should also be interesting in a broader context. That holds 
especially for our innovative findings on tax avoidance. While specific avoidance 
practices strongly depend on tax regulations, a full prohibition of tax avoidance 
practices is difficult to imagine. Corresponding to our research, that general proposition 
also holds for FA tax schemes. Considering the introduction of an FA-based tax system 
in the European Union, tax avoidance might be even more relevant than in the case of 
Germany. The reason is that differences in national tax rules and administrative 
practices typically provide more opportunities for tax avoidance. Considering, for 
example, the Luxembourg leaks scandal, it remains questionable whether coordinating 
national tax policies will actually work well in practice. While most of our results hold 
for the full sample and for the small-group sample, we find FA spillover effects only for 
the small-group sample. This lack of significant evidence might result from a more 
difficult identification of tax effects for large-group entities. Nevertheless, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that FA spillover effects are relevant only for firms with a 
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limited number of establishments. Concluding, further empirical research on these 
issues (e.g., for other countries or industries) would be most welcome. 
Appendix A 
In this appendix, we briefly explain our approach to calculate the tax impact on payroll 
expense. As we exclusively use relative measures as dependent variables, our 
coefficient estimates cannot be directly interpreted as semi-elasticities. Using 
information from Table 4 and Table 5 as well as additional statistical data, we 
recalculate our estimates to provide corresponding quantitative information. As a 
starting point, we assume a firm with two (for the small-group sample, 2.21 
establishments on average) or three (for the full sample, 3.12 establishments on average) 
identical establishments. Note that most firms in our data are two-establishment or 
three-establishment firms. Parameter specifications for the establishments are based on 
mean values of our descriptive statistics. Hence, for the full sample, we initially assume 
that all establishments generate sales of € 38.9 million and have payroll expense of € 8.1 
million (both in 2005 prices).  
In a second step, we calibrate the change in the payroll expense (or another relevant 
variable) that would be necessary to obtain the estimated change in the dependent 
variable (e.g., Payroll share or Payroll per sales ratio). In so doing, we assume that 
payroll expense and (respectively other dependent variables) are reallocated from high-
tax to low-tax establishments. Hence, a higher tax rate in one establishment reduces 
payroll in that establishment and increases payroll in the other establishments of the 
firm without an effect of TaxD on the aggregate sum of payroll. For simplicity, we 
assume that the production factors are evenly shifted to all other establishments of the 
same firm. For the calculation of the tax impact on our “ratio” measures (Hours per 
employee ratio, Payroll per hour ratio, Payroll per sales ratio), we assume in our 
calculations that the denominator of the corresponding ratio (e.g., the number of 
employees in the Hours per employee ratio) remains unchanged. 
In an alternative setting, we also calculate the size of tax effects on the Payroll per hour 
ratio if the tax incidence hypothesis were true. Under this assumption, a change in the 
Payroll per hour ratio is not driven by a shifting of payroll from one establishment to 
another but by a reduced wage rate at one establishment at the expense of the employees 
of that establishment. Compared to the tax avoidance hypothesis, the tax incidence 
hypothesis requires a stronger tax impact on payroll at establishment i to generate the 
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. This is because the 
Payroll per hour ratio is not only driven by tax effects in establishment i but also by tax 
effects in other establishments, which are assumed to be zero under the tax incidence 
hypothesis. Thus, if we assume a firm with two (three) establishments, the tax impact 
becomes twice (triple) as high as in the case of the shifting hypothesis. 
With regard to the tax incidence hypothesis, we also compare the burden of an increased 
tax rate on firm profits with the expected reduction in after-tax wage costs. To calculate 
the additional burden resulting from a one-percentage-point increase in the German 
local business tax, we account for the deductibility of the German local business tax as a 
business expense before tax year 2008. The corporate income tax is assumed to be 25%, 
the solidarity surcharge 5.5% and the local business tax multiplier 4.5. To calculate the 
net benefit of a reduction in wage costs, we consider the deductibility of wages for tax 
purposes. We also account for differences between the assessment base of the German 
local business tax (adjusted pre-tax profit) and the wage costs of the firm. Thus, we 
assume that 25% of interest charges are non-deductible interest expenses and therefore 
increase the tax base of the German local business tax.  
Corresponding to representative balance sheet information for the German 
manufacturing sector from 1997 to 2008,20 wage costs are on average approximately 
4.08 times higher than the tax base of the German local business tax. Hence, reducing 
wage costs by one percent would generate much higher savings than reducing the 
assessment base by one percent. Considering the deductibility of the local business tax 
as a business expense, a one-percentage-point increase in the local business tax rate 
reduces profit by 0.79%, while the corresponding reduction in wage costs increases 
profit by 5.67%. 
                                                 
20  We use representative balance sheet data for the manufacturing sector reported in the statistical special 
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Figure 1: Local business tax rates in Germany, 2008 
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Table 1: Definitions of regression variables  
Variable Definition 
Payroll shareit Payroll of establishment i in year t divided by the sum of payrolls of all establishments 
i = 0 to I in year t 
Employee 
shareit 
Number of employees of establishment i in year t divided by the sum of employees of 
all establishments i = 0 to I in year t 
Hours per 
employee ratioit 
Average hours worked per employee in establishment i and year t divided by the sum 
of average hours worked per employee across all establishments i = 0 to I in year t 
Sales shareit Sales of establishment i in year t divided by the total sales of all establishments i = 0 
to I in year t 
Investment 
shareit 
Investment in fixed assets in establishment i and year t divided by the sum of 
investments in fixed assets across all establishments i = 0 to I in year t 
Payroll per hour 
ratioit 
Average payroll per number of hours worked in establishment i and year t divided by 
the sum of average payroll per number of hours worked across all establishments i = 0 
to I in year t 
Payroll per 
sales ratioit 
Average payroll per sales in establishment i and year t divided by the sum of average 
payroll per sales across all establishments i = 0 to I in year t 
TaxDit Difference between tax rate of establishment i in year t and the unweighted average 
tax rate of all other establishments in year t 
Unemploymentit Unemployment rate of district of establishment i in year t in percentage points 
GDP per capitait Natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita of district of establishment i in 
year t 




Table 2: Number of firms and establishments per year 
Panel A: Full sample 
Year Firms Establishments
Establishments per firm 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1997 2,250 6,974 3.09 2.00 4.12 
1998 2,449 7,779 3.18 2.00 6.80 
1999 2,345 7,259 3.09 2.00 3.94 
2000 2,534 7,835 3.09 2.00 3.51 
2001 2,487 8,025 3.22 2.00 7.10 
2002 2,552 7,989 3.13 2.00 3.68 
2003 2,541 8,075 3.18 2.00 3.75 
2004 2,667 8,528 3.20 2.00 3.77 
2005 2,792 8,753 3.13 2.00 4.20 
2006 2,882 9,059 3.14 2.00 4.47 
2007 1,740 5,118 2.94 2.00 3.56 
2008 1,778 5,284 2.97 2.00 4.47 
Sum 29,017 90,678 3.12   
Panel B: Small-group sample 
Year Firms Establishments
Establishments per firm 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1997 1,858 4,095 2.20 2.00 0.40 
1998 2,015 4,427 2.19 2.00 0.39 
1999 1,935 4,276 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2000 2,073 4,598 2.21 2.00 0.41 
2001 2,042 4,495 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2002 2,068 4,566 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2003 2,055 4,544 2.21 2.00 0.40 
2004 2,153 4,740 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2005 2,294 5,055 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2006 2,370 5,198 2.19 2.00 0.39 
2007 1,461 3,229 2.20 2.00 0.40 
2008 1,495 3,319 2.21 2.00 0.41 
Sum 23,819 52,542 2.21




Table 3: Development of local business tax rates over time 
Panel A: Local business tax rates per year 
Year N Mean Median Std. Dev.
1997 7,029 0.1542 0.1507 0.0181
1998 7,833 0.1544 0.1489 0.0186
1999 7,306 0.1554 0.1525 0.0182
2000 7,929 0.1548 0.1525 0.0182
2001 7,921 0.1550 0.1525 0.0180
2002 8,058 0.1552 0.1525 0.0180
2003 8,030 0.1561 0.1525 0.0183
2004 8,473 0.1569 0.1525 0.0184
2005 8,705 0.1572 0.1525 0.0185
2006 9,055 0.1576 0.1525 0.0184
2007 5,119 0.1588 0.1561 0.0182
2008* 5,220 0.1327 0.1295 0.0181
Total 90,678 0.1546 0.1525 0.0191
Panel B: Tax cuts and tax increases per year 
Increasing tax rates Decreasing tax rates 
Year N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev 
1998  818 0.0068 0.0054 73 -0.0108 0.0120 
1999  413 0.0071 0.0069 223 -0.0044 0.0056 
2000  425 0.0055 0.0038 176 -0.0053 0.0057 
2001  461 0.0073 0.0069 347 -0.0051 0.0041 
2002  581 0.0072 0.0066 94 -0.0091 0.0086 
2003  967 0.0077 0.0079 119 -0.0064 0.0127 
2004  549 0.0066 0.0068 60 -0.0081 0.0082 
2005  694 0.0068 0.0058 126 -0.0068 0.0076 
2006  515 0.0063 0.0037 120 -0.0088 0.0104 
2007  103 0.0065 0.0051 193 -0.0073 0.0089 
2008* 0 0.0000 0.0000 5,220 -0.0262 0.0021 
Notes: AFiD panel industrial units of the manufacturing industry.  
*: The Business Tax Reform 2008/2009 reduced the basic rate of the local business tax. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales (1,000 euro) 38,892.27 6,736.57 199,851.91 90,678 
Gross investment (1,000 euro) 3,542.40 290.40 25,446.08 90,678 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 8,601.54 1,692.95 46,967.13 90,678 
Number of employees 318.85 82.08 1,343.55 90,678 
Monthly hours per employee 135.49 133.03 27.32 90,678 
Local business tax rate 0.1546 0.0191 0.1525 90,678 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0003 0.0000 0.0198 90,678 
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0142 0.0109 0.0131 46,433 
TaxD < 0 -0.0156 -0.0121 0.0129 44,245 
Payroll share 0.3511 0.2658 0.2979 90,678 
Employee share 0.3463 0.2598 0.2912 90,678 
Hours per employee ratio 0.3440 0.3384 0.2112 90,678 
Sales share 0.3478 0.3374 0.2353 90,678 
Investment share 0.3491 0.3580 0.2000 90,678 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.3468 0.3388 0.2269 90,678 
Payroll per sales ratio 0.3282 0.2549 0.3225 90,678 
Unemployment rate (district level) 0.1054  0.0920 0.0481 90,678 
GDP per capita (district level) 26,453 23,726 11,073 90,678 
Population (district level) 332,160 198,964 481,340 90,678 




Table 5: Descriptive statistics for subsamples 
Panel A: Small groups (< four establishments) Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales (1,000 euro) 31,651.72 7,349.57 157,414.96 52,542 
Gross investments (1,000 euro) 2,735.99 346.06 19,660.29 52,542 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 6,478.32 1,834.66 31,614.51 52,542 
Number of employees 252.39 89.92 961.52 52,542 
Monthly hours per employee 134.35 131.76 24.76 52,542 
Local business tax rate 0.1528 0.0185 0.1489 52,542 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0005 0.0000 0.0215 52,542 
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0145 0.0107 0.0144 28,011 
TaxD < 0 -0.0176 -0.0139 0.0143 24,531 
Payroll share 0.4925 0.4775 0.2893 52,542 
Employee share 0.4868 0.4741 0.2791 52,542 
Hours per employee ratio 0.4843 0.4905 0.1462 52,542 
Sales share 0.4892 0.3495 0.4727 52,542 
Investment share 0.4901 0.3696 0.4730 52,542 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.4886 0.4846 0.1760 52,542 
Payroll per sales ratio 0.4629 0.4536   0.3183 52,542 
Unemployment rate (percent, district level) 0.1018 0.0880 0.0476 52,542 
GDP per capita (district level) 25,799 23,619 10,203 52,542 
Population (district level) 315,657 194,169 455,311 52,542 
     
Panel B: Large groups (≥ four establishments) Mean Median Std. Dev. N 
Sales (1,000 euro) 48,867.97 5,609.63 246,290.04 38,136 
Gross investments (1,000 euro) 4,653.43 211.53 31,700.99 38,136 
Payroll expense (1,000 euro) 11,526.82 1,384.55 62,075.61 38,136 
Number of employees 410.43 66.42 1,733.18 38,136 
Monthly hours per employee 137.06 134.65 30.43 38,136 
Local business tax rate 0.1570 0.0196 0.1561 38,136 
TaxD (tax rate differential) -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0172 38.136   
TaxD ≥ 0 0.0138 0.0115 0.0108 18,422 
TaxD < 0 -0.0132 -0.0108 0.0105   19,714 
Payroll share 0.1562 0.0963   0.1738 38,136 
Employee share 0.1527 0.0912 0.1719 38,136 
Hours per employee ratio 0.1507 0.1423 0.1100 38,136 
Sales share 0.1530 0.0849 0.1924 38,136 
Investment share 0.1548 0.0508 0.2268 38,136 
Payroll per hour ratio 0.1516 0.1378 0.1183 38,136 
Payroll per sales ratio 0.1426 0.0617 0.2199 38,136 
Unemployment rate (district level) 0.1104 0.0980 0.0484 38,136 
GDP per capita (district level) 27,352 23,858 12,113 38,136 
Population (district level) 354,896 202,658 514,190 38,136 
Notes: AFiD panel industrial units of the manufacturing industry; price-adjusted data; own calculations. 
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Table 6: Results: Payroll share 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Payroll 
share 







Sample Full sample Small groups Large 
groups 
Full sample Full sample Full sample 
TaxDt -0.427** -0.678*** 0.0140 -0.447** -0.482*** -0.445* 
 (0.172) (0.203) (0.189) (0.182) (0.178) (0.245) 
TaxDt × Small groupt    -0.0455   
    (0.202)   
TaxDt × Establishmentst     -0.00464  
     (0.00593)  
TaxD × LN(Establishmentst)      -0.136 
      (0.130) 
Investment sharet-2 0.0352*** 0.0272*** 0.0185*** 0.0311*** 0.0340*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.00267) (0.00290) (0.00448) (0.00253) (0.00264) (0.00245) 
Sales sharet-2 0.107*** 0.0716*** 0.0454*** 0.0860*** 0.102*** 0.0748*** 
 (0.00603) (0.00673) (0.00848) (0.00546) (0.00589) (0.00519) 
Unemployment 0.00318*** 0.00487*** 0.00168** 0.00295*** 0.00341*** 0.00331*** 
 (0.000692) (0.000955) (0.000759) (0.000658) (0.000684) (0.000644) 
GDP per capita -0.0213* -0.0313* -0.0133 -0.0211* -0.0212* -0.0193* 
 (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0103) 
Population -0.00660 -0.0128 -0.000692 -0.00390 -0.00571 -0.00255 
 (0.00852) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.00825) (0.00815) (0.00785) 
Small groupt    0.150***   
    0.00510   
Establishmentst 
    
-
0.00232***  
     0.000135  
LN(Establishmentst)      -0.144*** 
      0.00371 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,678 52,542 38,136 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Within R2 0.0451 0.0248 0.0206 0.127 0.0661 0.181 
Adjusted R² 0.901 0.894 0.869 0.910 0.903 0.915 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed description of the dependent and 
independent variables is provided by Table 1. 
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Table 7: Results: Factor allocation and tax avoidance (small-group sample) 







Sales share Investment 
share 




TaxDt -0.109 -0.634***   -0.546*** -1.271*** 
 (0.182) (0.179)   (0.203) (0.276) 
TaxDt-1   -0.0494 -0.518**   
   (0.214) (0.248)   
Investment sharet-2 0.0244*** 0.0124*** 0.0244***  0.0109*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00255) (0.00352)  (0.00303) (0.00413) 
Sales sharet-2 0.0867*** 0.0144***  0.0417*** 0.0447*** -0.130*** 
 (0.00583) (0.00519)  (0.0134) (0.00615) (0.0103) 
Payroll sharet-2   0.117*** 0.0295**   
   (0.00958) (0.0148)   
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Within R2 0.0536 0.177 0.0276 0.00285 0.106 0.0206 
Adjusted R² 0.946 0.565 0.907 0.659 0.516 0.770 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed 
description of the dependent and independent variables is provided by Table 1. 
 
Table 8: Results: Factor allocation and tax avoidance (full sample) 







Sales share Investment 
share 




TaxDt 0.0789 -0.324**   -0.240 -0.776*** 
 (0.159) (0.153)   (0.164) (0.212) 
TaxDt-1   0.232 -0.0730   
   (0.161) (0.187)   
Investment sharet-2 0.0324*** 0.0205*** 0.0266***  0.0175*** 0.0258*** 
 (0.00218) (0.00228) (0.00301)  (0.00259) (0.00364) 
Sales sharet-2 0.120*** 0.0547***  0.0579*** 0.0763*** -0.0642*** 
 (0.00532) (0.00450)  (0.0112) (0.00508) (0.00817) 
Payroll sharet-2   0.153*** 0.0820***   
   (0.00753) (0.0121)   
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Within R2 0.0794 0.129 0.0475 0.0101 0.0869 0.00859 
Adjusted R² 0.939 0.808 0.906 0.709 0.760 0.799 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed 




Table 9: Robustness checks: Payroll share 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share Payroll share 
Robustness check TaxMaxD TaxMaxD Controls Controls Timing Timing 
Sample Small groups Full Small groups Full Small groups Full 
TaxMaxDt -0.446*** -0.157**     
 (0.158) (0.0674)     
TaxDt   -0.657*** -0.381***   
   (0.212) (0.185)   
TaxDt-1     -0.484*** -0.288** 
     (0.164) (0.137) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls Yes Yes  No No  Yes Yes  
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,542 90,678 52,542 90,678 52,542 90,678 
Within R2 0.0243 0.0448 0.00468 0.00446 0.0242 0.0448 
Adjusted R² 0.894 0.901 0.891 0.897 0.893 0.901 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed 
description of the dependent and independent variables is provided by Table 1. 
 
Table 10: Robustness checks: Alternative calculation of the tax rate differential 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Sales share Investment 
share 





Panel A: Small-group sample 
TaxMaxDt -0.0364 -0.273*   -0.214 -0.767*** 
 (0.142) (0.142)   (0.162) (0.226) 
TaxMaxDt-1   0.130 -0.165   
   (0.157) (0.190)   
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Within R2 0.0535 0.176 0.0277 0.00269 0.105 0.0196 
Adjusted R² 0.946 0.565 0.907 0.659 0.516 0.769 
 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxMaxDt 0.00128 -0.0516   -0.0217 -0.135* 
 (0.0638) (0.0597)   (0.0626) (0.0815) 
TaxMaxDt-1   0.151** 0.0769   
   (0.0632) (0.0734)   
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Within R2 0.0794 0.129 0.0476 0.0101 0.0868 0.00778 
Adjusted R2 0.939 0.808 0.906 0.709 0.760 0.799 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Detailed 
descriptions of the dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 1. Panel A refers to the small-group 




Table 11: Robustness checks: Factor allocation and tax avoidance – without establishment controls 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Sales share Investment 
share 





Panel A: Small-group sample 
TaxDt -0.118 -0.633*** -0.545*** -1.310*** 
 (0.176) (0.178) (0.204) (0.280) 
TaxDt-1  -0.0962 -0.529**  
    (0.189) (0.251)    
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Within R2 0.00204 0.175 0.00153 0.00118 0.102 0.00654 
Adjusted R² 0.943 0.564 0.905 0.658 0.514 0.766 
 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxDt 0.130 -0.300*   -0.208 -0.799*** 
 (0.174) (0.157)   (0.170) (0.212) 
TaxDt-1   0.237 -0.0498   
     (0.176) (0.198)     
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Within R2 0.00367 0.118 0.00255 0.00210 0.0751 0.00505 
Adjusted R² 0.934 0.806 0.901 0.707 0.757 0.798 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls No No No No No No 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed 
description of the dependent and independent variables is provided by Table 1. Panel A refers to the small-group 
sample (firms with less than 4 establishments) and Panel B refers to the full sample. 
 
Table 12: Robustness checks: Factor allocation and tax avoidance – timing effects 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Sales share Investment 
share 





Panel A: Small-group sample 
TaxDt   -0.137 -0.444   
   (0.253) (0.282)   
TaxDt-1 0.0694 -0.236   -0.401** -0.832*** 
 (0.147) (0.145)   (0.168) (0.234) 
Observations 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 52,542 
Within R2 0.0536 0.176 0.0277 0.00278 0.106 0.0195 
Adjusted R² 0.946 0.565 0.907 0.659 0.516 0.769 
 
Panel B: Full sample 
TaxDt   0.170 -0.0978   
     (0.196) (0.215)     
TaxDt-1 0.183 -0.0761   -0.149 -0.512*** 
 (0.124) (0.122)   (0.134) (0.181) 
Observations 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 90,678 
Within R2 0.0796 0.129 0.0474 0.0101 0.0869 0.00810 
Adjusted R² 0.939 0.808 0.906 0.709 0.760 0.799 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, are documented in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. A detailed 
description of the dependent and independent variables is provided by Table 1. Panel A refers to the small-group 
sample (firms with less than 4 establishments) and Panel B refers to the full sample. 
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Table 13: Long-run effects 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 















Short run effects (as also documented by Table 9 and Table 11)
TaxDt -0.657*** -0.118 -0.633***   -0.545*** -1.310*** 
 (0.212) (0.176) (0.178)   (0.204) (0.280) 
TaxDt-1    -0.0962 -0.529**   
    (0.189) (0.251)   
Long run effects 
TaxDθ -0.814*** -0.0346 -0.554***   -0.576** -1.299*** 
 (0.258) (0.239) (0.215)   (0.247) (0.342) 
TaxDθ-1    -0.248 -0.632*   
    (0.293) (0.349)   
Establishment controls No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 50,196 50,196 50,196 42,620 42,620 50,196 50,196 
Within R2 0.00515 0.00216 0.172 0.00596 0.00396 0.0993 0.00631 
Adjusted R² 0.892 0.945 0.892 0.913 0.669 0.513 0.770 
Notes: Regressions are calculated by OLS with establishment fixed effects and year fixed effects, but without 
establishment controls. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, which have been clustered at the establishment level, 
are documented in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Long-run effects are calculated as documented by Subsection 5.3. 
 
 
